Political System

Consitutional Reform

Ukraine is a republic under a semi-presidential system separate legislative, executive, and judicial branches. Ukraine has recently undergone an extensive constitutional reform that has changed the balance of power between the executive and legislative branches and their relationship to the President. A reform to local self-government has been suggested, but is yet to be formally approved.

Going back even further, to March 2003, it was then President Leonid Kuchma who got the reform wagon rolling with the introduction of a bill that he said would make the country into a "parliamentary-presidential model most widely used in the democratic countries of Europe." Critics accused Kuchma of trying to weaken the presidency that he would be sure to lose after the elections in October 2004. The head of Kuchma's administration, Viktor Medvedchuk, was credited with coming up with the idea as sort of an insurance policy against an opposition victory.

Kuchma's original reform package differed quite a bit from the amendments passed this January. His proposals to create a bilateral legislature and to hold the presidential and parliamentary elections on the same day were hotly contested by the opposition and eventually disappeared. The bill was withdrawn altogether by the president himself. In the mean time there appeared two new draft laws, very similar to one another, and both put forward by pro-presidential lawmakers in 2003. In late December of that same year, one of these draft laws got past its first reading in parliament. It was also controversial, proposing that the president be elected by parliament. Foreign and domestic criticism mounted until, during a vote in April 2004, a coalition of pro-presidential and leftist factions fell just six votes short of passing it even though the part on parliamentary election of the president was removed.

Yushchenko and his supporters were triumphant, gaining much needed momentum in the run up to what would be a long, hard fight for the presidency. It was during the cold war on Khreshchatyk several months later, when ordinary people continued to brave severe weather conditions to force the incumbent authorities to recognize Yushchenko's November electoral victory that the prospect of reform resurfaced. The support of the Socialists, who supported constitutional change, would be crucial in the revote for the presidency, which had been approved by the Supreme Court for late December.

Faced with the threat of division and defeat, Yushchenko silently accepted amendments to the country's main law, which were based on the last of the three draft laws from 2003. Over 400 of the parliament's 450 people's deputies voted in favor. Nineteen abstained. Yulia Tymoshenko, Yushchenko's long-time and fiery political ally, was the most outspoken of all against the last-minute compromise.

So now Yushchenko has inherited enormous powers from his predecessor. The constitutional reforms are supposed to turn over some of these powers to the parliament as well as the Cabinet, which the parliament will largely select. Those who support the reforms argue that under Kuchma the Cabinet often competed with the presidential administration in matters of executive authority; while under Yushchenko a third player has entered the fray: the National Security and Defence Council, headed by Petro Poroshenko, another long-time Yushchenko ally. Critics of the reforms say that overlapping powers will spark unresolvable standoffs between the parliament, the Cabinet and the president.

For the time being, the president appoints the prime minister, whom the parliament must approve, and then a Cabinet is put together. Starting in January 2007, the premier is chosen by a majority formed within the parliament. The premier then nominates most Cabinet members, who are approved by parliament. The president will get to nominate only the defence minister and foreign minister, whom, again, parliament approves and dismisses.

Parliament continues to appoint, on nomination by the premier, the chairperson of the Antimonopoly Committee, the chairperson of the State Committee on Television and Radio Broadcasting, the chairperson of the State Property Fund of Ukraine, the head of Audit Chamber and the Ombudsman.

Yushchenko still retains significant authority. He is still able to nominate and initiate the dismissal of the prosecutor general, head of the SBU (spy chief), National Bank and Central Electoral Commission; although the parliament has to confirm these nominations. More importantly, the president keeps the sole right to appoint all regional governors.

Like Kuchma, Yushchenko will continue to issue authoritative decrees. He is able to dissolve the parliament if lawmakers fail to form a majority within a month after the elections, they fail elect a new Cabinet within sixty days following its resignation, or they hold a plenary meeting within thirty days of a single regular session. Other prerogatives like the right to initiate legislation and the dismissal of the Cabinet also call into question charges that there is a weakened presidency.

Out of the following situation we may expect two possible scenarios to unfold in the next two years leading up to the presidential elections.

First, the Anti-Crisis coalition will successfully change the constitution to complete the transformation of Ukraine into a parliamentary republic. The president would be elected by parliament, as in neighbouring Moldova, and no longer by popular vote. Within the Anti-Crisis coalition, which has 240 deputies, the two left-wing parties have always supported the abolition of the presidential institution.  The Party of Regions also shares this view.

Our Ukraine could arrive at the altogether logical conclusion that Yushchenko cannot win a second term. A constitutional change would require an additional 60 votes to that possessed by the Anti Crisis coalition that could be provided by Our Ukraine. Their rationale for providing the votes would be that they rather nobody have the presidency than to give it to Yanukovych or Tymoshenko in 2009.

The holding of early parliamentary elections might remove the need for Our Ukraine to provide the additional votes to effect constitutional change. The Party of Regions would be likely to increase its faction's representation by early elections.

Second, if the constitution is not changed and the presidential institution continues to exist, the second round contest would be between Yanukovych and Tymoshenko. This would become a repeat of the 2004 elections when Yanukovych was also prime minister with the orange candidates merely changed from Yushchenko to Tymoshenko.

Tymoshenko would have an uphill struggle to win the elections as her revolutionary profile may be popular with the average person in the street but is distrusted by Ukraine's business elites.